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Let me say at once that ... I attach far more
importance to the general prosperity of the Transvaal,
to the development of its industry and its agriculture,
to making it a great country, the home of thousands of
working British people, carrying on an ever-increasing
trade with their fellow-workers over here.
Kilner, The Nation and the Empire, 106.
... to direct a steady outflow of men of British stock
to the younger countries of the Empire must thus be a
constant object of Imperial policy. Of greater
importance still is the quality of the emigrants. And
that depends upon the character of the nation from
which they are drawn. Thus the consistent Imperialist
is inevitably led to concern himself with those
influences which affect the condition of the mass of
our people here at home. He cannot help being a
zealot for social improvement.
ibid, xl.
Capitalist development in Southern Africa, particularly in Kimberley and on the Rand,
was very much the result of the penetration of British and foreign capital as well ac
the rapid growth of commercial interests. The continued expansion of the mining
industry, with its huge amounts of initial capital outlay, particularly after 1893
when the deep levels came into operation, depended upon the state of the capital
markets of Europe: speculative booms in "kaffir" shares not only lined the pockets
of investors but also provided new working capital, for little capital was raised by
the issue of debentures, (l)
This meant, at the South African end, that mining companies often had to
operate under constraints inherent in their financial structure; short-term profit
maximization was needed to create new working capital and pay out dividends, thus
raising the company's speculative appeal, enabling it to raise yet further working
capital by share issues. In addition, the Rand was a fast growing urban and
industrial market, which attracted a wide variety of commercial interests and export-
orientated industries, many of which had progressively been excluded by tariffs from
some of the more remunerative industrialized European or North American markets.
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At the London end, however, the very ability of the various mining houses
and holding companies to play the London stock market and raise working capital
depended upon the state of the British economy and the predilections of portfolio
holders. (2) This also applied to some of the British export-orientated industries
with interests on the Rand, whose performance depended very much on their ability to
raise working capital through new share issues, thus allowing them to manufacture new
product-lines attuned to the needs of the market.
The state of the British economy, however, was not robust, particularly with
respect to trade and the manufacturing industry. The effects of the Great Depression
had been the subject of a Royal Commission in 1896, but even so between 1883 an<i 191?
the share of world trade in manufactured goods in British hands dropped from 57.1 per
cent to 24.4 Per cent, whereas Germany's proportion rose from 17.3 per cent to 23 per
cent, and America's from 3.4 per cent to 11 per cent. (3) Throughout the 1880s and
1890s neither government nor industry were unaware of this trend; Chamberlain in
particular made British trade and export performance the subject of yet another number
of enquiries and commissions. (4) The national press, too, exploited the theme of
Britain's relative economic decline to the full and more often than not Germany was
portrayed as both the country's main trading and, by implication, political rival. (5)
As world industrialization proceeded at a high rate of some 3.8 per cent per
annum between 1870 and 1913* the rate of growth of British exports and trade was bound
to be subject to pressure (the T/Y ratio of foreign trade as a percentage of Rational
Income declined from 59.0 per cent in the 1880s to 55.8 in the 1890a). (6)
It can be argued that this pressure, however, could have been diluted in a
number of ways. Firstly, Britain could have developed new export categories and/or
produced specialized and high-grade types of existing goods. This strategy required
a high propensity to innovate and a resources-transfer from old established into new
sectors, such as electrical engineering, at home.
Secondly, industry could have attempted to improve competitive ability in
existing trading goods by reducing costs. In the European markets, however, such a
cost reduction would have been cancelled out "by higher tariffs and in any case price
competition was not the only form of competition. Indeed, in the case of the Rand
market, marketing techniques, after-sales service, packing, etc., were regarded by
many agents as far more important than the undoubted quality of British
manufac ture s. (7)
The third solution to the challenge of industrialization abroad was to
continue to produce the same goods in more or le?s the same way, but to redirect
exports to new markets such as the Rand with the assistance of capital exports.
Indeed, it is arguable that the declining relative importance of industrial markets
in favour of an expansion of trade in certain primary producing markets over the
period 1890-1914 helped to maintain the obsolescent structure of Britain"13 export-
orientated industry and failed to provide opportunities for long-term growth, partly
because the absence of rivalry from other exporters in these markets was only
temporary and existed as.long as world trade continued to grow. (8) The massive
influx of German and American manufactured products to the Rand after 1895
illustrated the volatile and unprotected nature of Britain's "new11 markets. (9)
The link between Britain's industrial performance between 1880 and I9I4 and
the rate and direction of British overseas capital investment is moz*e than just a
tenuous one. In January 1899 Rothschild advised Rhodes, who apparently had an excess
cash fund of £500,000, to invest in a whole host of long-term, fixed return bonds and
Consols, including the Ottoman 4% 1891 and the India 3s$6 rupees 1854-5. Rothschild's
timely advice may undoubtedly have reflected the general apprehension felt in
financial circles about the state of affairs on the Rand, for he did not believe that
any gold mining company was worth investing in; his recommendations were, of course,
"a list1 of what I should buy for a favoured client if he entrusted me with the"
investment ...". (10)
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In fact, Lord Rothschild, who was no mean speculator, echoed more than
anything else a broad trend within British foreign portfolio investment. The rates
of return on British overseas investment portfolios during the period 1880-1914
averaged about 4 per cent, which is consistent with the description of the aggregate
portfolio as bond-laden (usually railways or local government) and chosen to suit the
tastes of both conservative rentiers and evidently, if Rothschild is to be believed,
of speculators.- Although' many domestic industrial equities generated higher average
rates of return - though, of course, they were correspondingly riskier - investors
generally preferred the decidedly less risky foreign portfolios, (ll)
That the risk preferences of British investors directly affected the
performance of British industry is particularly noticeable when one considers that
during periods when foreign investment was temporarily less remunerative, e.g. 1890-1
and 1895-6, rentiers increased either their consumption, their holdings of money
balances or their mortgage investments. (12) At no time was a slackening in overseas
investment reflected in a corresponding upswing in,domestic equity investments, which,
after all, were the main means of access by companies to new working capital. Unable
to increase their capital formation, British export industries could not develop new
export lines or meet the varying demands of new markets.
Finally, patterns of foreign investment also affected the structure and
level of domestic demands. Foreign investment importantly affected the export sector
and-directly, or indirectly, large amounts of foreign lending were translated into
extensive orders for exports, (lj) However, as the main beneficiaries of increased
demand for exports were generally well established industries, foreign investment
reduced the incentive to diversify through the creation of new lines of goods, because
new lines usually depended on domestic markets for initial developments and marketing
appeal. Generally speaking, the tendency for export production to be less diverse than
production for domestic use was further reinforced by the concentration of, for example,
engineering export markets in the less industrialized countries with their more
rudimentary requirements, at least during the initial stages of their capital
development.
By reducing the level of demand for British engineering goods and by
deflecting what demand there was away from new, market-orientated lines, British
foreign investment thus depressed the profitability and retarded the expansion and
diversification of domestic engineering firms relative to what might have been
reached with more extensive domestic investment. The incomplete structural
development of Britain's engineering industries with regard to new lines is particularly
noticeable when one considers the industry's performance on the WitwaterBrand market;
by the early 1900s British companies, which had been unable to raise sufficient working
capital to switch their production of rock drills based on the reciprocating piston
principle to axial-feed water drills, had lost their earlier near-monopoly to American
manufacturers. (14)
In other word3, by the 1890G British capitalism was confronted by a
structural crisis with a severe lack of capital formation at hone compounded by a
slack export performance even in the less industrialized markets, where, like in South
Africa, a standard line of products was actually being pushed out altogether by
foreign competition. Continued domestic capital accumulation was jeopardized by the
risk preferences of investors, who remained unenthusiastic about pouring funds into
domestic equities. (15)
Both Chamberlain, as a Midlands industrialist, and Miner, as an economist,
former secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and a Chairman of the Board of
Inland Revenue, were aware of at least some of the structural problems hampering
sustained economic growth. Chamberlain, in particular, recognized that if the
industrialized markets of America and Europe were being progressively closed to
British trade by the imposition of tariffs, then this trade would have to be directed
towards the less industrialized formal, or informal, empire, where competition was
slight and consumer demands less at variance with what British industry could, and
would, produce. (16)
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I have argued elsewhere that the desire to incorporate a burgeoning Rand
market more firmly into the British commercial orbit was, at least, a contributory
cause of the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer conflict: a British administration on the
Rand would not only safeguard the existence of a more open market for British
manufacturers but would also guarantee long-term uninterrupted capital accumulation
within the mining industry, which was largely dominated by British capital
interests. (17) .Indeed, it was argued that, with the establishment of British rule
over the Rand, "costs per ton of ore milled would be reduced by 5/- to 6/- and the
immediate effect of such an action would be a) to increase the total tonnage and
gold value by reason of the addition of Main Reef ore, the grade of which in the past
fell below the pay limit b) excess profits attributable to this cost reduction would
be upwards of £550,000 ...". In addition, the Rand would bring "some comfort in view
of the uneasiness about the future of British trade"; the total Transvaal import- -
export trade in I899 was estimated at £30,000,000 per annum and, in view of the
exhortation that "the English people should spread themselves out and get elbow-room",
the obvious implication was that this trade was at least potentially secure for
British industry. (18)
In 1900 Chamberlain expressed himself in a similar enthusiastic vein about
the future of British trade in South Africa, when he informed a meeting of the
Imperial Institute that
there will be great numbers going to develop not only
the mineral resources of this country -which have
already been opened up, but those still greater
resources which we know to exist. In every kind of
business occupation - manufacturing, industrial,
mining - there must of necessity be great development
and this country will be drawn upon for the majority
of those who will carry out that development ... (19)
Milner wholeheartedly agreed, and added that the Transvaal was "a magnifican!; estate
which has been woefully mismanaged ... it requires no extraordinary statesmanship, it
simply requires ordinary, decent government and a reasonable liberality in public
finance". (20) Milner's optimism was mirrored in a flurry of publications and
reports by governmental commissions to South Africa.
Both W. Bleloch's The Mew South Africa. Its Value and Development (1901)
and Henry Birchenough•s government report, The Present Position and Future Prospects
of British Trade in South Africa (Cd 1844» 1903) described in fulsome tezms Britain's
commercial and industrial opportunities on the Rand. Ben Morgan's influential Report
on the Engineering Trades of South Africa for the National Industrial Association
(1902) was, however, rather more pessimistic and tended to reflect the tenor of
domestic trade reports such as the one published in 1903 by the Board of Trade on
British and Foreign Trade and Industry. Both Morgan and the Board of Trade dwelt on
the nature and vigour of foreign competition, the noticeable lack of new machinery
and products by British manufacturers and, more importantly, the fact that many
British manufacturers refused to market products attuned to the specific and'varied
needs of local consumers. (21)
In Britain the national press was aware of the country's precarious
economic position and proceeded to publish, throughout the period I9OO-4, numerous
articles on "Doomed. British Shipping","The Economic Decay of Great Britain" and, of
course, "The Growth of German Exports". (22) In so doing the press was instrumental
in fostering the emergence of the ideology of "liational efficiency" which lambasted
the relatively poor export and trading performances of Britain.
At the same time, this "efficiency" ideology provided a framework within
which notions about Imperialism and the need to "protect" the .Empire against unfair
commercial competition as well as semi-scientific concepts about race superiority,
strong administration (e.g. Hilner's regime in South Africa after 1900), social
reform, militarism a la Wilhelmian Germany, etc., could flourish. (23)
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Efficiency was also a kind of ideological response to the laissez-faire
individualism which had been the hallmark of British capitalism for several decades.
State interventionism in both the economy and social relations in the form of a
redirection of productive capital's markets, urban planning (miner's particular fad)
or state pensions, became ideologically respectable among hard-pressed Midlands
industrialists and certain sections of the ruling class. The methodical application
of state intervention required a carefully structured administration, necessitating,
in Milner's words, "a prescient mind and resolute will" (24), but which would then be
able successfully to confront the generally acknowledged socio-economic crisis facing
the country.
Within Britain the government's response to the crisis in productive capital
was lack-lustre and led to a number of commissions on shipping, foreign competition,
etc. (25) Within the context of the newly conquered South African colonies, however,
Whitehall's response after 1900 was of an entirely different and radical nature.
Chamberlain's most forceful attempt to drag British industry screaming and kicking
into the twentieth century was by ensuring that Milner pushed several multi-million
pound orders for the newly established Central South African Railways (CSAR) and the
land settlement schemes via the Crown Agents in the direction of British industry.
As "the purchases of the New Colonies ... will be exceptionally large,
British manufacturers shall have preference, other things being equal, in the
expenditure of funds". (26) Considerable sums of money were involved in these
purchases; originally some £10 million had been earmarked for "development purposes"
in the Transvaal, which largely meant railways,and although by 1904 this sum had been
whittled down to £7 million - "precious little" in Milner's opinion (27) - the South
African Minest Industries and Commerce Journal did note, in 1903. that "large and
important orders have recently been placed by the Crown Agents in England for rolling
stock and rails for the CSAR. Seventy-four locomotives ... are now in course of
construction". (28)
In fact, in order to ensure that the CSAH's orders would only benefit Britieh
industry, Chamberlain informed both Milner and Sir Percy Girouard, the initial head of
the CSAR, that only the Crown Agents and its sub-agents in Birmingham (sic) should be
contacted. The Milner regime and the CSAR were "not [my italics] to purchase goods
from local (i.e. South African) agents and store-keepers as all our experience is
against an arrangement of this kind unless in exceptional circumstances". (29)
By 1903 both Chamberlain and Milner had become convinced that Tariff Reform
would greatly assist British trade and industry and give it the apparently necessary
protection and guaranteed markets against foreign competition. In May 1903 Milner
told Chamberlain: "I need hardly say that personally I watch the struggle at home
[over tariffs and preferential trade] with the deepest interest and, of course, with
the heartiest sympathy with the line you have taken ..." (30) In fact, Milner promised
to "push for a preference of 25 per cent in favour of products of the British-Empire1'
at the Bloemfontein Inter-Colonial Conference of early 1903. Although his policies on
preference were strongly supported by the Rand and opposed only by "a few Cape Town
and Port Elizabeth merchants of the mugwump variety" (31). their reception in Great
Britain was one "of apparent complete indifference ...".(32)
With respect to the British explosives industry, however, both Chamberlain
and Milner were slightly more successful. Prior to I899 the mines had been obliged
to purchase their explosives from the Nobel-owned Zuid Alrikaansche labriek voor
Ontplofbare Stoffen (ZAFOS) at highly inflated prices. (33) After the Boer War, the
mining industry, anticipating correctly that, in the words of Georges Rouliot in 1902,
the British administration would "lead to a proper application of local laws" (34),
successfully called for the immediate abolition of the ZAFOS monopoly. In 1903 the
mines were consuming some £750,000 worth of explosives per annum. As many companies
were still developing their mines for production and did not operate any ancillary
plant as yet, their main working costs were in the mine; this meant that for many •
mines, particularly those marginal low grade ore deep-levels opened up during the
brief 1902 boom, the cost of explosives was a much higher proportion of their total
working costs. (35)
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Having arbitrarily abolished the ZAFOS monopoly in 1901, however, Miliier
aoon discovered that he could not really afford to alienate either Nobels or its
emissary to South Africa, Lord Ribblesdale. (36) The Nobel Trust and its Glasgow
subsidiary managed to pressurize Chamberlain and Milner into keeping its old ZAFOS
Modderfontein works open "as a British-run concern" at-least until 1905* when De Beers'
Cape Explosives Works finally managed to dislodge Nobels from its predominance over
the Rand market.
In spite of both Miner's and Chamberlain's earnest attempts, British
commercial and industrial interests did not move into the Transvaal at an accelerated
rate after 1900. In April 1901 Milner strongly supported Sir David Barbour's
recommendation of the total abolition of all 7iif VeT cent ad valorem duties on imports,
which would undoubtedly have helped to make British imports more competitive. (37)
Nevertheless, the structure problems confronting British industrial
performance, with ita low rate of capital formation and its inability to exploit
successfully varying market opportunities, defeated all attempts at official assistance
even within the confines of the Rand market, where agents and engineers, if the gputh
African Mines, Industries and Commerce Journal is to be believed, had a high propensity
for purchasing British goods. (36) In 1900 British, exports to South Africa comprised
64.05 per cent of total imports (inflated because of the war), but by 1907 this
percentage had declined to 56.75 per cent. In absolute terms, too, imports for the
corresponding period had declined from £14,778,017 to £14,331,654. In 1908 British
imports into South Africa declined even further, to £13,313,289 or 56.19 per cent of
total imports. (39)
In 1907 S. J. Truscott, in The Witwatersrand Gold Fields: Banket and Mining
Practice, noted that the vast majority of machine drills were either made by Ingersoll
Sergeant, or the Rand Drill Co, both of New York, and that the "Climax" drill by
R. Stephens, Sons, of Cornwall, was no longer as popular as before. (40) In fact, as
early as 1903, the Goch Mine, clearly intent on profiting from the anticipated rise
in production after the imminent arrival of Chinese labour, purchased the five largest
boilers south of the equator from the Sachsische Maschinenfabrik, Chemnitz. (41)
Later in the year, the South African Mines etc. noted that "the outlook for electrical
plant is as encouraging as that for almost any line of manufacture. The strongest
bidder for the trade, however, is Germany ...". (42) Much of British industry's
inability to re-establish its pre-war predominance over the Rand market was due not
only to its insensitivity to market opportunities but also to the persistently
sluggish and recession-ridden performance of the Transvaal economy throughout the
period up till 1914. As late as 1912 Britain still accounted for only 58-03 per cent
of all imports into South Africa and the Board of Trade Commissioner noted that growth-
related imports of mining machinery, electrical wires and cables, iron and steel piping,
etc., were dominated by Germany and America, with 17.99 per cent of total imports. (43)
II
It is the indefiniteness of our aim which is at the
root of our troubles. At present it is really quite
difficult to say what we are driving at with all this
immense expenditure of money and energy ... (44)
Any possible "indefiniteness" in the clear pursuit of restructuring
capitalist relations of production in the post-war Transvaal was quickly brushed
aside by Milner's administrative freneticism. His concern to frame his actions in
accordance with a long-range and comprehensive objective and his opposition to the
traditional empiricism, which he stigmatized derisively as "drift", was firmly rooted
in the Edwardian ideology of national efficiency as well as in his own experiences as
an administrator in Egypt. (45)
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Milner had been the Egyptian Under-Secretary of State for Finance between
1889 and 1892. In 1891, in a lengthy interview with The Scotsman, he pointed out
enthusiastically that "the British administration had removed the whip, interrupted
the bribe, controlled the water supply .,.". Mindful, as ever, of the considerable
economic benefits for Britain of Lord Cromer's benign rule in Cairo, Milner quickly
added that "two-thirds of Egypt's exports are taken to British ports. Nearly one-
half of her imports are derived from British factories. Agricultural revival in
Egypt means a larger and cheaper supply of cotton for the British market ..." (46)
Undoubtedly Milner viewed the Transvaal of the 1900s as analogous to the Egypt of the
1880s. Certainly Miner's main apologist, Basil Worsfold, extensively touched upon
the many similarities between Egypt and the Transvaal and noted the need for strong-
administration in both countries. (47)
Central to his resuscitation of the "woefully mismanaged estate" and any
subsequent economic benefits accruing to Britain, however, was the development of the
Transvaal gold mining industry. In early 1903 the mining industry was, once again, in
the throes of a depression. Many of the mining houses had been left with a large
number of newly opened deep-levels which were unworkable because of their low-grade
properties. The share markets of London and the Continent were "kaf fir "-weary and so
such losses could not really be recouped through manipulation of the stock-market,
though, of course, a sizeable reduction in working costs with the aid of the Milner
regime might ease the most pressing production problems.
Milner was only too pleased to assist the mines. As ea^ly as 1902 he had
agreed not to make the new Gold Law retrospective and allowed the aimiig companies to
deduct war costs from the next year's (1905) tax liabilities. IJurinj the same year,
Patrick Duncan had commented that "whatever stimulates the mining industry is an
indirect benefit to the whole community". (4Q) With this resounding aphorism in mind,
Milner set out to assist in every way the mining industry's attempts to restructure
its productive process along more cost-effective lines. Aware that "what water was
to Egypt, unskilled labour was to the Transvaal" (49), Milner vigorously supported
the Chamber of Mines1 attempts to reduce African wages and import Chinese labour. (50)
Indeed, he cajoled the initially reluctant Colonial Office and lambasted local
opposition, claiming that "industrial development, irrigation, railways, etc., and
the loyalty of the I>utch all depended upon Chinese labour ...". (51)
While some of the constraints under which the mining industry had to function
during the period 1902-6 have been more extensively dealt with elsewhere (5?), an
additional and important constraint inherent in the financial structure cf the mining-
houses made it imperative for capital to call upon The Mil nor regime in itr. attempts
to effect cost minimization and control over its labour force.
Prior to the Boer War, a great many of the gold mining companies were, in
part, speculative ventures and additional working capital was largely raised by the
continual issue of new shares. A considerable proportion of these shares, howevsr,
were vendor's shares held at, or below, par. In 1899» for example, out of"£15,98?,^9p
worth of equities issued, a mere £6,065,081 was actually o>rpended on new cn.pits.1
developments, while the remainder was held as immobile, speculative capital.
As the market started moving "upwards", the vendors and insiders tended to
release their shares, thus capitalizing further on their initial outlays. Moreover,
the retention of this immobile share capital led to the creation of a highly leveraged
capital structure, giving relatively ineagre profits to the many and large profits to
the privileged few. It is not aurprisir^ therefore thai Beit could info in Rhodes in
1891 that "I rather invest in properties here [Rand] where I can laaktj 15 to 20 per
cent with money without the risks which are apparent in the diamond mining
industry ...". (53)
During the kaffir boom of 1895-6 some £12,282,660 worth of capital raised
externally was working capital, while a hefty £25,810,229 was speculative vendors'
capital. (54) After 1902, following the untimely demise of the poni-war boo-n, tho
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mining companies found it increasingly difficult to float new ventures. (55) Indeed,
there is evidence to suggest that the overall shortage of externally raised capital
for much-needed further deep-level developments and, of course, speculation persisted
until at least 1906, when Lionel Phillips informed Selborne that "the cost of desirable
improvements and extensions will, in most cases, have to-be provided out of the profits
of the concern ...". (56)
In fact, a certain amount of additional working capital had, of course,
been raised internally within the industry; during the period 1887-1900 some
£4,906,392 or 34 per cent of available profits had been appropriated from revenue for
reinvestment. After the war, however, as part of a broad statistical trend it can be
discerned that between 1900 and 1914 £17,941,824 worth of working capital was raised
internally, which, compared to a pre-war figure of £4,906,392, represented an increase
of no less than 261 per cent (my italics). (57)
This trend, which points to both an absolute and a percentage increase in
internally raised working capital, undoubtedly had important repercussions for the
mining industry. Post-war dividend payments did not register a decrease, but the
annual appropriation from revenue for reinvestment did show this substantial increase,
which meant that the mining industry was caught in a vice. On the one hand, the
industry had to maintain a modicum of returns, if only to satisfy investors and
stabilize the market. (58) On the other hand, their output had to be increased
substantially to cover both these returns and the enlarged amount of internally raised
working capital, for little new capital was raised externally. Only an additional
1.3 per cent, or £472,841 worth of working capital, was raised externally after the
war, compared to pre-war figures.
Working costs had to be reduced, and Miner's efforts undoubtedly made a
considerable impact. A straightforward 10 per cent tax on mining profits, a more
efficient and enlarged railway network, reduced tariffs, an increased ability to
write off depreciation of machinery against tax returns, etc., all helped to reduce
the industry's considerable overheads. The mines' largest single cost component,
however, was still labour,and the additional pressure to raise essential working
capital internally resulted immediately in the mines attempting to raise further output
per unit of labour by, in the case of Chinese face-workers, piece-work. (59) Indeed,
capital, with the aid of the Mlnerite regime, had generally to increase coercion at
the point of production in order to raise output, hence Milner1s acquiescing to the
flogging of Chinese labourers in the compounds. (60)
While both Chamberlain and Miner showed a remarkable lack of understanding
of the workings and structure of the mining industry and failed to appreciate the
critical problems which shortages of working capital immediately raised, the latter
was aware that cost minimization could be effected partly by a reduction in both the
costs of imported machinery and the overall cost of living. (6l) In fact, both these
objectives, Milner noted, could partially be achieved by a reliable railway^.
network. (62) The British administration had set up the CSAE and the railway budget
formed the largest single item of the Guaranteed Loan of £35,000,000. Some £10,000,000
was to be spent on the "new development" of the two former republics,and of the latter
sum one-half was assigned to-the construction of the new railway lines. Not
surprisingly, therefore, Miner could enthuse, in 1903, that "we have £5 millions to
spend between the Orange and the Limpopo. The question is how best to spend it? What
lines are needed most?" (63) Quickly pre-empting any unsolicited answers to his
rhetorical questions, Milner ensured that the Bloemfontein Railway Extension Conference
unanimously decided that yet another coal line along the Rand had to be constructed, at
a cost of £740,000. Moreover, Miner also pushed through the building of the
£956,000 "Grain Line" from Bloemfontein to Johannesburg.
Any reservations Chamberlain might have had about this scheme, which would
only benefit the Rand as well as the OFS and Cape farmers, were resolutely brushed
aside by the High Commissioner, for "the lines themselves are greatly wanted ... to
promote the economic development of the country". (64)
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III
Central to Miner's attempts at assisting the. mining industry and
strengthening the "British element" was his creation of an administration from which
directives on the reconstruction of the Transvaal were supposed to emanate. A strong
administration with clear policy objectives was, of course, linked to the ideology of
"efficiency" as well as to notions of Imperialism - as Milner once remarked, "this
country [England] is a country rich in men who have an instinct for governing backward
races. As long as our Public Schools turn out such Men we shall not be under pressure
to give up our Empire ..." (65)
At first he had attempted to attract Uitlanders to his new Transvaal
administration, but after a number of gaffes he decided to play it safe and return to
culling his administrators from the ranks of the Oxbridge e"lite. (66) Accordingly, in
1902, Milner drew up an exhaustive list of potential Transvaal administrators:
without avail men such as James Watt and Edward Grogan, a Balliol man and recommended
by Patrick Duncan, had a "bad degree" but were "rowing men who felt that their salary
was immaterial". (67) His penchant for Oxbridge-educated administrators was, of course,
not unusual other than that, once in South Africa, the proliferation of these
administrators led to the emergence of the "Kindergarten" mythology. (68)
Throughout the early I9OO5 numerous magazine and newspaper articles, aB well
as speeches "by politicians such as Lord Rosebery and Asquith, publicly bemoaned the
wide variety of ills that had apparently befallen Britain; Germany m d America were
stronger economically, and the physical health of the British race had been painfully
exposed by the high rate of infant mortality and the poor recruitment figures during
the Boer War. (69) One comprehensive answer to a number of these seemingly
insurmountable problems lay in a properly governed country free from squabbling
politicians and run by efficient administrators. A policy of "national efficiency"
was called for and its main advocate wa3 Arnold White, whose book, Efficiency and
Empire,had a tremendous impact on early Edwardian ideology. (70) Indeed, in 1905,
the Daily Mail even editorialized that it would only support Parliamentary candidater
who "best fulfilled the demands of the great principle - Efficiency". (71)
Miner and his administration in the T LVinsvaal were socn viewed an the
embodiment of this efficiency principle: "what the Empire needs now ... is d man, if
possible, who has thought, who has seen and who knows, a man with an iron will." (72)
Milner, with his experience as a bureaucrat in Cairo, regarded Empire and
administration as complementary, if not synonymous, and his beliefs blended in
naturally with, those of the efficiency ideologues, whose considerable social and
political impact was enhanced by adherents such as Sidney and Beatrice Webb,
H. G. Wells, Grey, Rosebery, Lyttleton Geil and George Bernard Ghaw. (73)
The empire played a fundamental ideological rolej it would enable Britain
to withstand foreign competition by providing the country with secure "natural"
markets. Tariff Reform was, in part, an inevitable 01'fshoot of efficiency. In
addition, the empire would halt the continued physical degeneracy of the British rase
by allowing emigration to the healthier climes of tne Antipodes or South Africa. (74)
The Kindergarten and Milner showed how, like in Egypt, an efficient "British
administration, free from the shackles of party politics, could attempt to transform
a country overnight; the Kindergarten graduates were applauded, for "the aristocracy
is nothing more than the most efficient people in the nation" . Indeed, "the upper
classes", Arnold White noted, "are fundamentally sound". (75) Milner, who
consistently kept in close touch with developments in England, was quictcly enveloped
by the enthusiasm for efficiency and informed Lady Edward Cecil in 1903 that the
Cabinet was "unwieldy" and that administrative responsibility should be graded
efficiently so that vital Imperial issues would not become mixed up parish pump issues
such as "a row in the Guards". (76) In fact, as early as 1900 Milner had been
involved with lyttleton Gell and Birchenough in setting up the Administrative Reform
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Association with the aid of the editor of The Nineteenth Century. Sir James
Enowles. (77)
Milner also felt that "Joe might have to give -way to the pressure of
parliamentary necessities, of Party and of a rotton public opinion". (78) His
contempt for party politics was quickly picked up by some members of the efficiency
cult: Lord Rosebery mused about "putting the British Empire on a business
footing" (79). while Philip Lyttleton Gell wrote to Milner in 1904, in the aftermath
of the Russo-Japanese conflict which had greatly excited the efficiency ideologues (80),
that
I shall turn Japanese fox they at least can think and
act and be reticent. I fail to see any Western people
in a position to set the Japs an example in their
diplomacy, their strategy, their virile qualities,
their devotion and their self-control. Above all,
their national capacity for self-reliant self-sacrifice
and their silence [sic] . -. (81)
Milner undoubtedly concurred, and during the same year he returned to the
themes of reticence, devotion and "control, in a letter to P. H. Congdon, the Secretary
of the Imperial Federalist Association, when he also said that what was needed in
Britain and South Africa was "a powerful body of men, and it would have to be very
powerful, determined at all times ... to work regardless of any other consideration,
against the man or the party who played ... with the cause of National Unity. I shall
always do that ... (82)
Miner's fervent belief in the efficacy of administration was not the only
policy which found sustenance in the ideology of efficiency. His myriad policies on
emigration, afforestation, land settlement, etc., also had their tap-root in
efficiency, though the broader interests of the mining industry were never far from
the surface.
Milner hoped that increased emigration to South Africa would numerically
swamp the Boer element, thus ensuring continued British political supremacy. He
predicted confidently that, within some five years of the end of the war, the British
population would be more than doubled. In other words, what he required was nothing
less than a large-scale exercise in social engineering; again, the mechanism he
counted upon was "the certainty of a vast and immediate expansion of mining and of
other enterprises after the war which would enable the economy to support a vastly
increased population of British workmen". (83) Unfortunately, this economic expansion
never materialized.
As he regarded emigration primarily as an arithmetical exercise at the best
of times, Milner failed to conceive of the possibility of a split among the B'fitish
population along class lines on such is&ues as Chinese labour. This, however, did
not prevent him from taking a very keen interest in emigration, and in March 1903 he
noted with satisfaction that during the first three months of that year South Africa,
with 11,616 emigrants, was the third most popular immigrant country after the USA and
Canada. (84)
Emigration and Empire went together; "if the British population did not
increase fast enough to fill the empty spaces of the empire, others would". (85) In
other words, emigration would not only swamp the Boer element but also keep potential
competitors at bay and help to incorporate the country more firmly into the British
economic orbit. Unfortunately, although the national press abounded with articles on
"population is power" and the "future of the Empire and country", which depended upon
a numerically large population, the birth rate had been declining and infant mortality
had been rising in Britain ever since the 1870s. (86)
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Not only the future of the empire but of the British race was threatened
by these particular trends. Here again, a programme based on national efficiency was
needed, for
what is the use of Empire if it does not breed and
maintain in the truest and fullest sense of the word
an Imperial race? What is the use of talking about
Empire if here, at its very centre, there is always
to be found a mass of people, stunted in education,
a prey to intemperance, huddled and congested beyond
the possibility of realizing in any true sense either
social or domestic life? (87)
These sentiments readily found their response in Milnera He had been involved in
social reform, however peripherally, since his early days as a lecturer on Socialism -
"there is nothing terrible or unwanted in it" (88) - in Whitechapel. Miner
eventually rejected socialism and believed that the evils of contemporary society
could best be mitigated by efficient administration. He admired Bismaxckian Germany,
where administration and planning provided workers with houses, welfare, pensions,
etc. (89) In 1904» one of the efficiency ideologues, T. C. Eorsfall, even wrote a
popular publication on Germany's superior town planning, entitled The Improvement of
the Dwellings and Surroundings of the People: the example of Germany. One of his
other publications, The Relation of National Service to the Welfare of the Community,
was carefully annotated by Miner in 1904 for "improved ... imperial government, to
put an end to the slums, the existence of which ruinB the physique of vast numbers of
our people ...". (90)
In fact, Miner's concern with National Service, emigration, etc, was
enthusiastically shared by a number of South African mining magnates and their cohorts.
C. S. Goldman, a director of several mining companies of the Anglo-French Farrar Group,
and Henry Birchenough, Board of Trade Commissioner and director of the British South
Africa Company, were on the National Service League's Executive Committee, (yl) In
1905 Goldman, in conjunction with such representatives of the Miner-mining industry
axis as Lionel Phillips, Owen Thomas (Hilner1 s educationalist), J. L. Garvin, etc.,
published a remarkable volume entitled The Empire and the Century, which explicitly
revealed at both an ideological and a practical level the extent of social engineering
mining capital and Miner were prepared to indulge in during the so-called
reconstruction of the Transvaal, Women's and workers' emigration, land settlement,
closer Anglo-Transvaal trade, municipalization, etc., were all to be encouraged and
supported by both government and "interested parties". Indeed, considering the true
extent of mining capital's involvement in the emigration and land settlement schemes,
the argument that at least some mining interests regarded Miner's social engineering
as a quid pro quo for "the great losses incurred by the industry during and after the
war ..." (92) appears to be a reasonably valid one.
In 1903 Chamberlain informed HiUner that women's emigration was now
government-aided and supervised by a specially appointed Government Secretary who, in
turn, liaised with the South African Expansion Committee (S/EC). In fact,"by January
1903, the SAEC (in mid-1903 it became the South African Colonisation Society [SACS]}
was apparently sending out some 100 women a month to South Africa. (9) The London
committee of the SAEC numbered amongst others as its members Mrs C. S. Goldman and
Mrs Lionel Phillips, while the Johannesburg advisory council included Sir Percy
Fitzpatrick, Mrs Drummond Chaplin and i;trs Sidney Jennings. (94) The SAEC's
Johannesburg Secretary, Mss Russell, frequently called upon Mi.lner to discuss and
iron out any unforeseen problems in the otherwise relatively smooth but limited flow
of women emigrants to the Rand. (95)
The activities of the SAEC were indirectly financed by Rhodes and Rothschild;
the mining industry had quickly realized that the emigration of women, both as
domestics and as wage-earners, would not only ease the demand for domestic labour and
push out the African house-boys into the mining labour pool but would also help to
stabilize the transient White labour force. (96) The mining' industry's close
involvement with emigration was apparent as late as 1906, when Lionel Phillips
informed Selborne that Wernher Beit would no longer financially assist the emigration
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of British labourers to the Rand until the political climate had become more
conducive to the industry's interests. (97)
In 1900-1 both Rhodes and Abe Bailey were prepared actively to support
Milner's land settlement schemes, which had been the subject of a Lands Settlement
Commission. (9&) The mining industry evidently felt that British settlers in the
countryside would help to increase the so-called "British element". At the same
time it was assumed that the settlers would farm intensively, thus providing at least
some of the foodstuffs for the Rand market, while paying rent for the extensive
landholdings of the mining companies. (99) In spite of extensive propaganda both in
England and the Transvaal, land settlement was a manifest failure. (100) Milner's
land settlement organizer, Owen Thomas, in a fit of hyperbole, even remarked that
"migration from one part of the Empire to another should involve no greater uprooting,
no further loss of English sentiment to a colonist than the transference of residence
from London to a village in Hertfordshire ...". (101) Potential settlers were
evidently unimpressed, for by 1906 there were still only 517 in the Transvaal. (102)
In fact, much of the government-owned land which was actually allocated to
the settlers was agriculturally useless; moreover, the wages on the Rand mines were
fax more attractive than the anticipated returns on isolated farms in the veld. As
with the majority of Milner's schemes, land settlement suffered from acute shortages
of funds almost from its inception - "the plain fact is that the Thirty-Five Million
Loan is insufficient to do what it was intended to do ,..". (103)
Both Milner and the mining industry had noted that much of the wood needed
for railway sleepers and supports in the mine-shafts had often to be imported from
abroad (104), and accordingly, in 1904, the Department of Agriculture recommended
the planting of vast forests as the railways alone "require 30,000 sleepers
yearly ...". (105) By this time, however, the Chamber of Mines was evidently too
involved in the Chinese labour issue, which in any case would result in a more
substantial reduction in operating costs than a more effective supply of timber.
This left Miner musing about afforestation in the sure knowledge that, had it
succeeded, he would have "done something of real momentum when one's paltry efforts
and struggles are forgotten ...". (106)
Milner's activities in the Transvaal had, of course, been far from "paltry".
His intimate liaison with mining capital in its attempts to control the labour supply
and restructure its modes of production now that access to large amounts of cash was
rather restricted, set the pace for the further development of state-capital relations
via the 1907 strikes to the Rand revolt and beyond. At the same time his overall
desire to co-operate with capital, which in any case has only selectively been touched
upon in this paper, was not total in that at all times throughout his sojourn in South
Africa Milner kept in close touch with British political and economic developments.
He 3hared with Chamberlain a reasonably clear perception of the crisis of British
productive capital; indeed, he was probably, as a former Secretary to Goschen, aware
of the severe shortage of gold bullion in the Bank of England prior to 1902", and the
impact that this had upon the Discount rate and domestic capital formation. (107) To
a certain extent he also shared with Chamberlain, who, in 1899» called for "an
alliance between the Teutonic race and the two "branches of the Anglo-Saxon
Race ..." (108), the belief that the British race was enfeebled and that vigoroiis
administration was the key answer to this problem and a whole gamut of related issues,
from eugenics to falling birth rates and emigration.
As such, even though a certain amount of what he had set out to achieve in
1900 never fully materialized, his enthusiasm for administrative reorganization for
covering the hills of the veld with tree plantations, or, more importantly, for
promoting British economic interests on the Rand, were, to a certain extent,
reflections of both an ideological and an economic crisis in Britain.
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